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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE #1: 
The lower court's granting of Galetka's motion to dismiss on the factual grounds 
that it was "without opposition" was clearly erroneous, since there is insufficient 
evidence to support it and because of glaring evidence that there was opposition to the 
motion. 
The Standard of review: The trial court's factual findings shall not be set-aside on 
appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v. Tvler. 850 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1993). 
Grounds for Seeking Review: Austin preserved this issue for appeal in her Response 
in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 152-163). She also conducted 
oral argument on the issue of dismissal. (R. at 307-313). 
Furthermore, the lower court's error was plain in that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and the error is harmful. See. State v. Irwin , 924 P.2d 5, 7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
ISSUE #2: 
The lower court's dismissal of Austin's Petition as moot, on me grounds that 
Austin had been released from custody, was incorrect since Austin was actually a 
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parolee being significantly restrained in the Orange Street Community Correctional 
Center. 
The Standard of review; The lower court's determination that Appellant's Petition was 
rendered Moot by her release from custody is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for 
correctness, according no deference to the lower court's conclusions. Gerrish v. 
Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 1992). 
Grounds for Seeking Review: 
Austin preserved the issue of dismissal for appeal in her Response in Opposition 
to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 152-163). She also conducted oral argument 
on the issue of dismissal. (R. at 307-313). 
Also, Austin had no opportunity to object to this ruling since it dismissed the 
case. Furthermore, the lower court's error was plain in that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and the error is harmful. See. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
ISSUE #3; 
The lower court's dismissal of Austin's petition as moot, on the grounds that 
Austin had been released from custody, was incorrect because Austin is subject to the 
collateral legal consequences of her conviction. 
The Standard of review: The lower court's determination that Appellant's Petition was 
rendered Moot by her release from custody is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for 
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correctness, according no deference to the lower court's conclusions. Gerrish v. 
Barnes. 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah 1992). 
Grounds for Seeking Review: 
Austin preserved the issue of dismissal for appeal in her Response in Opposition 
to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 152-163). She also conducted oral argument 
on the issue of dismissal. (R. at 307-313). 
Also, Austin had no opportunity to object to this ruling since it dismissed the 
case. Furthermore, the lower court's error was plain in that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and the error is harmful. See^ State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
ISSUE #4 
The lower court judge should have disqualified himself before deciding on 
Galetka's motion to dismiss because in 1997, Austin's attorney had filed a complaint 
against the lower court judge. 
The Standard of Review; In determining whether a trial judge committed error by 
failing to recuse himself or herself is a question of law, the appellate court reviews such 
questions for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Grounds for Seeking Review: 
When subsequent to the ending of a case, a party becomes aware of a matter 
which would have provided grounds for the disqualification of the presiding judge, the 
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reviewing appellate court must decide on the propriety of the Judge's participation if 
there is a sufficient basis to decide. See, Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 
P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1992). Austin's attorney, George L. Wright has provided this 
appellate court with a copy of the complaint he filed against Judge Young in 1997. 
(Addendum 2). The complaint provides this court with a sufficient basis to determine 
whether Judge Young's participation in this case was proper. Regional Sales Agency, 
Inc. v. Reichert. 830 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1992). 
Also, Austin could not have made a timely objection to Judge Young's presiding 
over this case because Austin did not know that Judge Young had been assigned to her 
case before receiving his minute order dismissing the case. Therefore, Austin had no 
chance, prior to the dismissal of the case, to request that Judge Young be disqualified. 
Furthermore, it is the duty of the Judge, not of counsel, to disqualify himself 
when he knows of a basis for disqualification. Regional Sales Agency, Inc, v. Reichert, 
830 P.2d at 257 fn. 7 (Utah 1992). 
Moreover, the lower court's error was plain in that the error exists, the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court, and the error is harmful. See, State v. 
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following rules and statutes are determinative or relevant with respect to some 
of the issues raised by Austin. 
Utah Code Jud. Admin, R. CANON 3E(l)(a) (2000) 
E. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited 
to instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a 
party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; 
URCP Rule 65C(i) (2000) 
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these 
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the 
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the 
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition 
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon 
the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed 
for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary 
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judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further 
pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court. 
Utah Code Ann, § 78-46-7 (1999) 
§ 78-46-7. Persons competent to serve as jurors — Persons not competent to 
serve as jurors 
(1) A person is competent to serve as a juror if the person is: 
(a) a citizen of the United States; 
(b) over the age of 18 years; 
(c) a resident of the county; and 
(d) able to read, speak, and understand the English language. 
(2) A person who has been convicted of a felony that has not been expunged is not 
competent to serve as a juror. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. The Nature of the Case 
This case is an appeal from an order dismissing a Petition for Post 
Conviction relief. The lower court gave two reasons for so ruling: 1) Galetka's motion 
to dismiss was without opposition and 2) Austin's petition was moot because she had 
been release from custody. (R. 293-294). 
b. The Course of Proceedings 
On February 9, 1998 Appellant, Jennifer Austin ("Austin") pled guilty to a 
second-degree felony (False Evidences of Title and Registration) and three 
misdemeanors. (R. 64-66). 
She signed a plea in abeyance agreement, which held the second-degree felony 
in abeyance for 36 months if Ms. Austin completed the requirements of her probation. 
(R. 55). 
On May 11, 1998, Ms. Austin's probation was revoked due to a probation 
violation. Ms. Austin was transported to the Utah State Prison for evaluation. She was 
later sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. (R. 145). 
More than six months after pleading guilty, on July 29, 1998, Ms. Austin, 
through her present attorney George L. Wright, filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 148). 
Later, upon her attorney's advice, Austin withdrew the appeal because Wright 
believed that: 
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1) Since Ms. Austin had given up her right to withdraw her guilty plea in the plea 
and abeyance agreement, the Court of Appeals could not hear her case; 
2) Ms. Austin had given up her right to appeal pursuant to the plea in abeyance 
agreement; and 
3) Ms. Austin's appeal was untimely because the date of the entry of judgment 
could reasonably be merged to the date of the entry of the plea. (R. 151 and R. 
174). 
Furthermore, since Ms. Austin's case involved allegations of denial of 
Constitutional rights, Mr. Wright withdrew the appeal, believing that extraordinary 
relief was the proper procedure. (R. 174). 
On January 8, 1999, Appellant, Jennifer Austin, filed her petition for Post 
Conviction relief. On March 15, 1999 the court determined that Austin's Petition was not 
frivolous pursuant to Rule 65 C(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Addendum 1 at 
p. 2). The lower court scheduled the case for a hearing on June 7, 1999. Id. The lower 
court also ordered Galetka to respond to Austin's memo by April 15, 1999. (Addendum 
1 at p. 2). Nevertheless, Galetka failed to file a timely response to Ms. Austin's Petition 
as ordered. 
Instead, on April 15, 1999, Galetka filed a motion to dismiss the petition for 
extraordinary relief. (Addendum 1 at p. 2). On May 19, 1999, Austin filed her response 
in opposition to Galetka fs motion to dismiss and also filed a motion to amend the petition 
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ijdendum I I |i "i I in .Inin " 1  ")99, the parties conducted 
oral ciir'uiin'iiii on (ialelka's motion ill dismiss (Addendum I .ill |i ii I  In/ toiiiil in led 
that Austin was to amend its petition and that Austin's attorney, Mr. Wriphl could call 
for a hearing date after he filed for the petition. (Addendum 1 at p. 3). On or about June 
W, IW), Austin * attorney, George T ™-:^t called Galetka's attorney and 1- n 
message . * :
 ( _j touri anu mai ne wa« 
going to call the -:*MIV ~ - .• . i .i •• * 
informed Mr. Wright that it could not set a date without a stipulation as to the uaiw 
between counsels. Mr. Wright called Galetka's attorney, attempting to obtain an 
agreeable dale lot1 the hearing, Galetka' s attorney ref used to agree, claiming that she 
must first file a i c: sponse • to the petition be fore v ire set a date. 
On June 11, 1999, Austin's amended petition for extraordinary relief was filed in 
the lower court. (R. 168). On June 30, 1999, Galetka filed a motion for enlargement of 
tune to respond to petition (R I i U) On .liilj < :», IW9, Vustin filed her opposition 
n 
July 14, 1999, Austin filed her Notice to Submit for a Decision pertaining to Galetka's 
motion for enlargement of time to respond to petition, (TR1 1 fi.Ti The court never ruled on 
I ialelka' s motion for enlargement m nine to respond to petition, 
MI lull • 'H 1^*W Galrtkii tiled Ins imtiineh lespunsc HI (itlilinii Irn posi • 
conviction relief. (R. 187). In that response, Galetka a<v.m i • •* sf 
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should be dismissed. (R. 193-197). Austin's attorney again attempted to set a date for 
hearing on the petition as ordered by Judge Dever. Again, Galetka's attorney failed to 
cooperate in scheduling a date for hearing. Mr. Wright decided to wait until the Court 
decided on Galetka's motion for enlargement of time to set the case for hearing. 
On October 8, 1999, Galetka filed his motion to submit for a decision on his 
request for dismissal. (R. 288). 
On November 1, 1999, Judge David S. Young granted Galetka's motion to dismiss 
"without opposition." (R. 293-294). The court also noted that Austin's petition was moot 
because she had been released from custody. (R. 293-294). The court further indicated 
that its minute entry would serve as the order of the court. Id. 
On December 1, 1999, Austin filed her notice of appeal. (R. 299-300). 
c. Background 
On May 15, 1997, Jennifer Austin's current attorney, George L. Wright, filed a 
complaint with the Judicial Conduct Commission against Judge David S. Young. 
(Addendum 2). Later, Mr. Wright represented, Jennifer Austin ("Austin"), during her 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, which is the subject of this appeal. Judge Dever had 
presided over most of the Post Conviction proceedings. (Addendum 1). Unknown to 
Austin and to her attorney, at some point in time, Judge Young was assigned to Austin's 
case. (Addendum 1). His first act was to grant the Motion to Dismiss in favor of Galetka. 
(R. 293-294). 
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i tibstantive Facts 
On January 11 , I'WJ i, „- tppclhinl, Ji'imilci Austin ,lmvc Ciislhoiui Il i II I MO Tli r 
car's owner sat in passenger's seat. ^k. 35-JOj. Trooper Rob B K; f* 
i i r- ^ihle drunk drive* ~ 35-36). Tht passenger, _: a ^ , mimediaiui) 
adniiitcu .*. ik/iu.. .^ .n I.-M. *.*:! DL longed to him 'P \5 ^6) A —isfration cli * 
attached to Liie , 
36). Since both occupants ua tanding ;^ ti 
placed Austin and the passenger in custody. (R. 35-36). While conducting a search 
Bench discovered a plastic baggie containing a green leafy substance, a pipe, and 
Viv. J 5 - J * 4 . ' i- ' * 
second-degree 1-J^JL, , License Plate and Registration Card Violations a class-C 
misdemeanor; Driving on a Suspended c ~ oked License a class-B misdemeanour; 
Failui i. lo Carry or Exhibit R egisti ation a class C misdemeanor; Possession of a 
Controlled Subs I Ji i lit .'c,!' ;i duss \ misdemeanor, Possession ol 1 )ni>!, Paiaplienmlm, ii t • I: * ?: r •-
B niisdemeanor; and Failure to wear a Seat Belt a class-C niisdemeanor. (R. 44-4d » 
On January 6, 1998, Judge Dever appointed an attorney to represent Ms, Austin. 
IKi The same attorney was app< ' *o represent the passenger, Mr. Estey, in 
d in r a s r i l i 1 ' i / i mi 'IIniliii«J''III In Il i l l ' - i 1111(1 I H'III ill i n dviM hri ol lhc potenlul 
conflict of interest arising from the fact that he and his law I n in was also repr . 
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the passenger. (R. 82-83). Austin's counsel also failed to advise the trial court of the 
conflict of interest when counsel discovered that the passenger had confessed that the 
vehicle belonged to him. (R. 82-83). Although the passenger had admitted that the car 
belong to him, Austin's counsel advised her to waive her preliminary hearing without 
explaining to her the chances of dismissing Counts I and II for lack of evidence that 
Austin knowingly altered the registration sticker and that she knew that the car's license 
plate was from another vehicle. (R. 82-83). 
On February 9, 1998 Ms. Austin pled guilty to the following four offenses: 
False Evidences of Title and Registration a second-degree felony; Driving on a 
Suspended or Revoked License a class-B misdemeanor; Possession of a Controlled 
Substance a class A misdemeanor; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor. (R. 229-230). She also signed a plea in abeyance agreement. (R. 244). 
During that sentencing proceeding, the trial court informed Ms. Austin that she was 
giving up her right to appeal this matter to a higher court. (R. 229 lines 14-15). Ms. 
Austin signed a twelve-page plea in abeyance agreement, which stated that by signing 
the agreement she had thirty days to withdraw her guilty plea. (R. 240). 
According to the plea in abeyance agreement, the second-degree felony was to 
be held in abeyance for 36 months if Ms. Austin completed the requirements of her 
probation. (R. 242). On May 11, 1998, Ms. Austin's probation was revoked due to a 
probation violation. (R. 263). Ms. Austin was transported to the Utah State Prison for 
12 
w,\> si lik'iiccil lii nil lii I i \i ,HS 111 lln I llrili ilalc hiMin ih 
266). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I. 
The lower court's finding that there was no opposition to Galetka's motion to 
dismiss was clearly erroneous and absolutely unfounded. There are repeated onslaughts 
of opposition contained in Austin's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and 
in her oral argument, through counsel on June 7, 1999, in open air. 
If, in an effort to give the lower court the benefit of the doubt, one stretches 
reason to consider Galetka's Response to Austin's Petition as a motion to dismiss, 
(since it also asks for dismissal), the finding of no opposition still lacks a legal basis. 
This is true for two reasons: 1) the Response was not properly before the lower court 
due to it being untimely and 2) Austin was not required to reply the Galetka's 
Response. 
ARGUMENT n. 
The lower court also based its dismissal of Austin's Petition on the proposition 
that, since Austin had been released, her petition was moot. However, as a parolee 
subject to conditions, which significantly confine and restrain freedom, Austin's release 
on parole does not render her petition for post conviction relief moot. 
ARGUMENT ffl. 
As a convicted felon in Utah Austin would be subject to laws allowing 
impeaching of a Defendant with a prior conviction, and disqualifying her from serving 
14 
i HI ri )t»ii\ Since Austin would delmitely be subject to collateral legal consequences of 
ARGUMENT IV. 
In 1997, Austin's attorney filed a complaint with "the Judicial Conduct 
Commission against the lower court Judge,, (Judge Young), concerning a matter outside 
I liliiiiN itise. 1 his treated, a I least, a personal prejudice aga - ;"'" lawyer such 
" "I "h 1 "Aii il iiiiiiiJi i .h nld haw il»iin|ii;ililicil - 1 li-mi, ulci iding 
on Galetka's motion to dismiss. Since "the lower judge uiu w de on G.-iMkn^ urn HI U i 
to dismiss, Austi n's right to a fair tribunal Has been infringed upon 'thereby violating 
due process undti iiit uiiunJ Siait-> \ (institution and th~ TTtih Constitution. 
. ctR^t .., . . ;y oraerew , * * 
merits hearing on the Petition was to take n u t 
dismissed the Petition upon questionable grounds. Thus, 'the outcome of the Petition 
certainly would have had better results for A ustiii had the lower court judge disquair 




THE LOWER COURT'S GRANTING OF GALETKA'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
ON THE FACTUAL GROUNDS THAT IT WAS "WITHOUT OPPOSITION" 
WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, SINCE THERE IS INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT IT AND BECAUSE OF GLARING EVIDENCE THAT THERE 
WAS OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION. 
The lower court dismissed Austin's Petition because Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss was without opposition. (R. 293-294). Thus, the factual basis for dismissing 
Austin's Petition was that there was no opposition to the Galetka motion to dismiss. 
Contrary to that, glaring facts demonstrating that there were oppositions to Galetka's 
motion to dismiss are contained in Austin's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss and in her oral argument through counsel on June 7, 1999. (R. 152- 163 and 
R. at 302). As to Austin's Response to Galetka's Motion to Dismiss, it contains 10 
pages containing the following arguments in opposition: 
1) Argument section I in that brief is entitled, "THE ISSUES IN MS. 
AUSTIN'S PETITION COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RAISED ON 
APPEAL." (R. 155). 
2) The title of Section II of the briefs Argument states, "EVEN IF MS. 
AUSTIN COULD HAVE RAISED THE ISSUES OF HER PETITION ON 
DIRECT APPEAL THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
16 
DJUDK 
3) Subsection b iollov.t> stating Qiut, * i ^ w * . ^ ^ , Exception is 
not Limited - ~* " , , ffective Counsel "" »T 
I l I lie ioiiwWiii^ „.n states, <; I lie I \)stn ^mictions Remedies \ ct 
"I "iiiiiiiniill II 1 ill in in II III } 'in I Nubias Corpus I ' xup l ,' \u Vt 'uinllll Il In I In, 
Constitution." (R. 158). 
5] HKII I *he lasi Section of Austin's Brief opposing Galetka's motion u> 
i.- .u**^ entitled THE IMPORT/ v (>!• MT<? AUSTIN'S 
C O N * : - • •• \ - *• i 
THAT HER PETITION BE HEARD." (R.160). 
No doubt Galetka's Motion to Dismiss faced opposition from Austin. 
Furthermore, there is no excuse for the lower court refusing to hold in its 
motion to dismiss (R ^0 
diligence would have disc le afore mentioned oppositions. Furthermore, once 
an ordinary lower court found the opposition it would not and could not have 
lower court's finding ic^ardinj1, this WHS lmlounih ill 
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In order to meet her marshalling requirement, Austin submits the following. 
Since only one motion to dismiss was filed, and it was definitely opposed. The only 
evidence the lower court could have utilized to reasonably determined that Galetka's 
motion to dismiss met no opposition from Austin, is if the lower court considered 
Galetka's untimely Response To Petition For Post-Conviction Relief as the motion to 
dismiss that it referred to in its Order. (R. 293-294). The court could have done this 
because Galetka's Response To Petition For Post-Conviction Relief does argue that the 
petition should be dismissed. (R. 193). Also supporting this is the fact that Austin did 
not file a Reply to Galetka's Response (Addendum 1 at p. 3). Even so, such reasoning 
lacks a legal basis to render it sufficient to support the finding that Galetka's motion to 
dismiss met no opposition. See, Child v. Gonda, P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998). 
First, there was no requirement that Austin file a Reply to Galetka's Response 
To Petition For Post-Conviction Relief. This is true because once a Petition and a 
Response are filed no other pleading or amendments are permitted unless the court 
permits. Rule 65C(i) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, Austin was not 
required to reply to Galetka's Response. 
Second, Galetka's Response To Petition For Post-Conviction Relief was 
untimely and thereby not properly before the lower court. This is so because at the end 
of the June 7, 1999 hearing on Galetka's motion to dismiss, lower court ordered that 
the normal times for filing the briefs would apply. ( R. at 313). The normal time to 
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respond to a IVi'iii m iiiii. lliirtv days pluM linn allowed lor sirviuv URCP 6S('(i). SIIKC 
Austin filed her Amended Petition on June 11, 1999, Galetka had 30 days plus 3 days 
(for being served by mail) to file his Response. (R. 168 ) (IJRCP:65C(i)"'and URCP 
6(e)), I hereioiv, (ialelku liutl iiudl July 14 , 1999 to lile his response. Nevertheless, 
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that, although Galetka had filed a motion for an enlargement of time to respond on 
June 30, 1999. vu- lower court failed to decide on his time enlargement moti : • a 
(Addendum i a. . Thus there was no court order to enlarge Galetka's time period 
to lit'i"1 in: icsponr • ntimely i esponse can not 
be deemed a motion to dismiss hv:«:ise it was ..- , •! "•. -ore the coi ii 1: I hi is, 
viewing the foregoing m L LL0LL -It iu die iowci wuiirf s determination, there is 
absolutely no factual basis for its finding that Galetka's Motion to Dismiss was without 
opposil i< a i. S e e , S t a t e y . P e n a , hi\M lJ" J d {K\ 1, 9.4 !vM\ (I Hah 199^1» I J i u s , its t a t lua l • 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n t h i s r e g a r d \\n\ \ \v n h n i o i i n i i i 1 iiiil i i N i n m i ' i r l o i r <isKs llinl t h e 
dismissal of 'this case be reversed. 
1
 Before the June 7th 1999 hearing, the lower court had also oidered thai (;,; -^ a 
file his response by April 15, 1999, (Addendum 1 atp 2). Galetka tailed to meet mat 
cut off date also. (Addendum 1 at p.3). 
2
 Austin filed her Opposition to the time enlargement motion and a 
submit for a decision on the time enlargement motion. (R, 181 and 185) 
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II. 
THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL OF AUSTIN'S PETITION AS MOOT, ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT AUSTIN HAD BEEN RELEASED FROM CUSTODY, 
WAS INCORRECT SINCE AUSTIN WAS ACTUALLY A PAROLEE BEING 
SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRAINED IN THE ORANGE STREET COMMUNITY 
CORRECTIONAL CENTER. 
The lower court also based its dismissal of Austin's Petition on the proposition 
that, since Austin had been released, her petition was moot. (R. 293-294). However, 
Austin was a parolee at the time of the lower court's order dismissing her Petition. 
(See. Addendum 3 (A letter, signed by Ms. Deborah Davidson, Director of Orange 
Street Community Correctional Center)). Even if the lower court was correct in 
labeling Austin as "released", Utah courts have adopted the federal rule that "release on 
parole does not render a petition for habeas corpus moot because parole 'imposes 
conditions which significantly confine and restrain [a parolee's] freedom.'" Northern 
v. Barnes. 825 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Jones v. Cunningham. 371 
U.S. 236, 243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 377, (1963)). When the lower court dismissed her 
Petition Austin was confined at Orange Street Community Correctional Center. 
(Addendum 3). This certainly renders Austin's confinement significant. Therefore, 
Austin's release on parole did not make her Petition moot. Since the lower court's 
ruling was incorrect in this regard, Austin asks that its dismissal order be reversed. 
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III. 
THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL OF AUSTIN'S PETITION AS MOOT, 
ON THE GROUNDS THAT AUSTIN HAD BEEN RELEASED FROM 
CUSTODY, WAS INCORRECT BECAUSE AUSTIN IS SUBJECT TO THE 
COLLATERAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF HER CONVICTION. 
A criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any 
collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged 
conviction." Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S. Ct. 1889 (1968). Such 
collateral legal consequences may include the use of the conviction to impeach the 
petitioner's character or as a factor in determining a sentence in a future trial, as well as 
the petitionees inability to vote, engage in certain businesses, or serve on a jury. Id. In 
Utah, Austin would be disqualified from serving on a jury due to her felony conviction. 
See. Utah Code Annotated 78-46-7(2). As a convicted felon in Utah she would also be 
subject to law allowing the impeaching a defendant, to inquire into the fact and nature 
of the prior conviction. See State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1982); citing 
State v. Kazda. 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (Utah 1963). Since Austin would 
definitely be subject to the possibility of collateral legal consequences of her conviction, 
her Petition is not moot. Again, the lower court incorrectly dismissed her Petition as 
moot; Austin asks that its dismissal order be reversed. 
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IV. 
THE LOWER COURT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE DISQUALIFIED HIMSELF 
BEFORE DECIDING ON GALETKA'S MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE IN 
1997, APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY HAD FILED A COMPLAINT AGAINST 
THE LOWER COURT JUDGE. 
In 1997, Austin's attorney filed a complaint with the Judicial Conduct 
Commission against the lower court Judge concerning a matter outside of this case. 
(Addendum 2). Austin argues that since her attorney, filed a complaint against the 
lower court judge, his impartiality might reasonably be questioned such that he should 
have disqualified himself from rendering his decision granting Galetka's motion to 
dismiss. (See. Addendum 2). Canon 3E (1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 
states in part that, 
"[a] judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where: (a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party or a party's lawyer." 
Canon 3E (1) of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, a "judge should recuse himself when his 'impartialityf might reasonably be 
questioned." State v. Neelev. 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 
1220, 108 S. Ct. 2876 (1988). No doubt, an appearance of bias existed in this case. A 
judge will certainly appear to be biased against a party's attorney when that attorney 
had previously filed a complaint against the judge. This is true because the filing of the 
complaint was a personal matter against that Judge in particular, accusing no other 
person save him. (See addendum 2). As recently stated by this State's Supreme Court, 
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" Bias and prejudice are only improper when they are personal. A 
feeling of ill will or, conversely, favoritism toward one of the parties 
to a suit are what constitute disqualifying bias or prejudice." 
In re Young. 984 P.2d 997, 1007 (Utah 1999). 
Moreover, it is the duty of the Judge, not of counsel, to disqualify himself when 
the judge knows of a basis for disqualification. Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v. 
Reichert. 830 P.2d at 257 fn. 7 (Utah 1992). Obviously, Judge Young knew of the 
Complaint filed against him in 1997. (Addendum 2, at its last page; indicating that the 
Judge will be provided with information concerning the complaint). He also knew from 
the lower court's case file that George L. Wright was representing Austin. Therefore, 
the lower judge had a duty to disqualify himself, since knowledge of the basis of 
disqualification can reasonably be imputed to him. 
Nevertheless, a trial judge's failure to disqualify himself based on the appearance 
of bias may be grounds for reversal if actual prejudice is shown. See State v. Gardner. 
789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S. Ct. 1837 (1990). 
Actual prejudice can be shown when there exists a reasonable likelihood that the result 
would have been more favorable for a party absent the trial judge's appearance of bias. 
See. State v. Gardner. 789 P.2d at 278. Also, the failure of a trial judge to recuse even 
where he should have, based on the appearance of possible bias or prejudice, does not 
require reversal unless the "substantial rights of the party are affected. Id. Austin now 
addresses these requirements pertaining to prejudice. 
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a. There is a Reasonable Likelihood That The Result of Austin's 
Petition Would Have Been More Favorable to Her if Judge Young 
Would Have Disqualified himself. 
In general, Galetka's Motion to Dismiss argued that since Austin did not raise 
the arguments contained in her Post Conviction Petition in her initial appeal, her 
Petition should be dismissed. (R. 97). Although Judge Young premised the dismissal of 
Austin's petition upon the claim that it was without opposition, Austin undeniably 
opposed Galetka's Motion to dismiss in the form of her written Opposition to Galetka's 
Motion to Dismiss as set forth earlier in this brief's Argument I. ( R. 152). Thus, it is 
more than clear that Austin opposed Galetka's motion to dismiss. A fair and reasonable 
judge would have simply looked through the court file and determined that Austin's 
Opposition Brief unequivocally opposed Galetka's motion to dismiss. 
Not only so, on June 7, 1999, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Austin 
through counsel argued orally against Galetka's motion to dismiss. (R. 202). From this 
is it clear that the outcome of this case would have been different if a unbiased Judge 
had presided over Austin's petition. This is so because a reasonable judge would not 
have dismissed the case because it was without opposition. In fact, Judge Dever, Judge 
Young's predecessor had already determined that a hearing was to take place after 
Austin filed her Amended Petition and Galetka had filed his response. (Addendum 1 at 
p. 3). Instead of conducting a hearing on the matter in accord with Judge Dever, Judge 
Young dismissed the Petition upon questionable grounds. Therefore, if Judge Dever 
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had continued as judge, Austin would have had a hearing on the merits of her Petition. 
Prejudice is evident. 
Please also note, that in denying Austin's Petition for mootness, Judge Young 
refused to address the merits of the Petition. This is true because "[w]hen declaring an 
issue moot, a court specifically declines to address the merits." State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 
840, 842 n.5 (Utah 1994). Therefore, the commandeering of her court ordered hearing 
prejudiced Austin. 
b. A Since Austin's Substantial Right to A Fair Hearing has been 
affected. The Lower Judge's Failure To Disqualify Himself (Based 
On The Appearance Of Possible Bias Or Prejudice), Requires 
Reversal. 
The failure of a trial judge to recuse even where he should have, based on the 
appearance of possible bias or prejudice, does not require reversal unless the substantial 
rights of the party are affected. See, State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d at 278.1d. 
A fair hearing necessarily includes an impartial tribunal. See, Marcello v. 
Bonds. 349 U.S. 302, 315; (1955); (Justices Black and Frankfurter dissenting). In this 
case, given the afore-mentioned appearance of bias together with the lower courts 
bizarre rulings as set forth above, it is apparent that Ms. Austin has been denied her 
right to a fair tribunal relating to her Petition. Since the right to a fair tribunal is 
essentially a due process right, Austin's due process rights under the United States 
Constitution and Utah Constitution have also been violated. (U.S CONST. AMEND XIV, 
§ 1; Utah CONST, art. I § 7.). 
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Also note that the lower court also based its dismissal on the claim that the 
matter was moot since Austin was released. As stated, Austin was on parole when her 
Petition was dismissed. Release on parole does not render a petition for habeas corpus 
moot because parole 'imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain 
freedom." Northern v. Barnes. 825 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Jones 
v. Cunningham. 371 U.S. 236, 243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 377, (1963)). Furthermore, a 
criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral 
legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction." Sibron 
v. New York. 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S. Ct. 1889. Since Austin would definitely be 
subject to the possibility of collateral legal consequences of her conviction, her Petition 
is not moot. 
Therefore, by the lower court's incorrect and adverse ruling Austin has been 
prejudiced, having been denied a substantial right, the right to a fair tribunal. See. 




Ms. Austin, based on the foregoing, requests that the dismissal of her Petition be 
reversed with an Order prohibiting Judge Young from presiding over this case in any 
manner. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of April, 2000. 
George 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that on this the ^<pday of April, 2000,1 caused a true and copies 
of the foregoing document to be delivered to the court and mailed to the persons named 
below, overnight FEDEX: 
Catherine Johnson 
Utah Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
\JLj4J2fr-
jtepfge L. G or  . Wright 
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ADDENDUM 1 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER GWEN AUSTIN v« . HANK GALETKA 
£E NUMBER 990300028 Post Conv Rel NonCap 
JRRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
L. A. DEVER 
IRTIES 
Petitioner - JENNIFER GWEN AUSTIN 
Represented by: GEORGE WRIGHT 
Respondent - HANK GALETKA 




)l-08-99 Filed: Petition For Extraordinary Relief roenag 
31-08-99 Filed: Memorandum Supporting Petition For Extraordinary Relief roenag 
)l-08-99 Filed; Affidavit Of Jennifer Gwen Austin In Support Of Her 
Petition For Extraordinary Relief roenag 
31-11-99 Case filed by roenag roenag 
31-11-99 Judge DEVER assigned. roenag 
02-18-99 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on March IS, 1999 at 11:00 AM in 
Room 321 with Judge DEVER. roenaa 
02-16-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 990300028 ID 590772 roenag 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE, 
Date.' 3/15/99 
Time: 11:00 a.m. 
Location: Room 321 
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
47 SOUTH MAIN 
TOOELE, UT 84074 
before Judge L, A. DEVER 
The reason for the change is Clerk error. 
02-26-99 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Cancelled. roenag 
Reason: Clerk error* 
02-26-99 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE scheduled on March 15, 1999 at 11:00 AM in 
Room 321 with Judge DEVER. roenaa 
02-26-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 990300028 ID 594463 roenag 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE. 
Printed: 01/10/00 13;50:37 Page 1 
USE NUMBER 990300028 Post Conv Rel NonCap 
Date: 3/15/99 
Time: 11:00 a.m. 
Location: Room 321 
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
47 SOUTH MAIN 
TOOELE, UT 84074 
before Judge L. A. DEVER 
The reason for the change is Clerk error, 
3-15-99 HEARING scheduled on June 07, 1999 at 02;00 PM in Room 321 with 
Judge DEVER. juiiek 
(3-15-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for Post Conv Rel NonCap juiiek 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Clerk: juiiek 
Video 
Tape Count: 11:32 
George Wright and Jeff Gray are available by telephone for a 
conference with the court. The respondent represents a Motion to 
Dismiss ia forthcoming. The court orders Attorney General to 
respond to petitioner's memo by 4/15/99* Mr. Wright to answer by 
5/17/99. A hearing is set 6/7/99 at 2:00 p.m. A copy of this file 
and criminal file on petitioner is to be provided to Mr. Gray. 
HEARING is scheduled. 
Date; 06/07/1999 
Time: 02*00 p.m. 
Location: Room 321 
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
47 SOUTH MAIN 
TOOELE, UT 84 074 
before Judge L. A. DEVER 
03-16-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 990300028 ID 602725 juiiek 
HEARING. 
Date: 6/7/99 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Room 321 
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
47 SOUTH MAIN 
TOOELE, UT 840 74 
before Judge L. A. DEVER 
The reason for the change is Court Ordered 
03-16-99 HEARING scheduled on June 07, 1999 at 02:00 PM in Room 321 with 
Judge DEVER. juiiek 
03-16-99 HEARING Cancelled. 
04-15-99 Filed: Motion To Dismiss roenag 
04-15-99 Filed: REspcndent's Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In 
Support Of Motion To Dismiss roenag 
05-19-99 Filed: Petitioner's Response in Opposition to Respondent's 
Frinted: 01/10/00 13:50:39 Page 2 
£E NUMBER 990300028 Post Ccnv Rel NonCap 
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Amend Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief marlyn: 
5-07-99 Filed: Notice OF Substitution roenag 
5-07-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law & Motion juliek 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Clerk; juliek 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney; GEORGE WRIGHT 
Petitioner (0) ; JENNIFER GWEN AUSTIN 
Attorney for the Respondent: ERIN RILEY 
Video 
Tape Count; 4;20 
HEARING 
Oral argument is heard on State's motion to dismiss. Court allows 
plaintiff to file an amended petition. Mr. Wright may call for a 
hearing date after he files the petition, 
36-11-99 Filed: Amended Petition For Extraordinary Relief roenag 
)7~06-99 Filed; Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion for 
Enlargement of Time To Respond to Petition marlynr 
37-26-99 Filed; Response to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief sharonc 
LO-08-99 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision sharonc 
U-01-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for MINUTE ENTRY-ORDER uman 




The Court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss without opposition. 
In addition, the Court notes that Petitioner has been released, 
thereby making her petition moot. 
This signed minute entry shall serve as the order of the court. 
C.C. to Counsel. 
11-23-99 Filed: Request for Transcript marlynr 
11-23-99 Filed: Order for Transcript marlynr 
12-01-99 Filed: Notice Of Appeal (ccpy of appeal forwarded to court of 
appeals this date) roen&g 
12-01-59 Filed; Request For Transcripts roenag 
12-06-99 Filed: Letter from Utah Court Of Appeals roenag 
12-09-99 Filed: Transcript (Motion To Dismiss) roenag 
Printed: Ol/10/OO 13:50:41 Page 3 (last) 
ADDENDUM 2 
Itate ot Uta 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION 
Steven H. Stewart 
Executive Director 
r * 
645 South 200 East *104 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801 \ 533-3200 
FAX801\533-3208 
George L. Wright 
Name 
243 East 400 South , #301 
Address 




REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINT 
TO: JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION 
I request that the Utah Judicial Conduct Commission undertake an investigation of 
Judge David S. Young , a member of the judiciary of the State 
of Utah. 
(Please provide a full factual statement upon which the complaint is based, together with the title 
of the case and case number, if known. Also, include the names, addresses and telephone 
numbers of other persons who can substantiate your complaint. If the complaint is documented 
or if you have documents supporting your contention you should supply copies of these 
documents to us with your complaint.) 
This complaint flows from the actions of Judge Young in the case 
of Jan DeBry v. Robert DeBry, Case No- 960903322 
PLEASE COMPLETE YOUR COMPLAINT ON REVERSE SIDE 
See "FACTS" a t t a c h e d 
Qf space is not sufficient, you should attach additional pages. Also attach anv Exhibits vou wish 
us tP consider.) 
Complai 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
On the day of May , 19*97 , personally appeared before 
me George L. Wright the signer of the above document, who being first duly 
sworn did say that the matters and things stated therein are true to the best of his/her knowledge, 
information and belief. 
My commission expires: 
NOTAKV PUBLIC 
'0557 South Crocus Street 
t i Sandy, UT840*4 
My Commission Expire* 
January i9 t 2001 
STATE OF irriu 
FACTS 
Because of rulings that I believed to be unfair against my client, Jan DeBry, in the 
case of DeBry v. DeBry (a tort action), I decided to investigate whether or not there was 
a relationship between Judge Young and Robert DeBry, of any of the law firms 
representing him. 
In my investigation I discovered that Judge Young's committee (the Committee 
for Judicial Excellence) received re-election contributions from the firm of Berman, 
Gaufin, Tomsic, and Savage. The publication of that firm's name and donation violated 
the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
After investigation I have concluded that Judge Young violated the Code of 
Judicial Conduct in his struggle to retain the bench in last November's election. 
Canon 5 (c) (1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that a candidate shall not 
make pledges or promise of conduct in office other than faithful and impartial performance 
of the duties of the office. A picture of Judge Young appeared on the Salt Lake Tribune 
several days before last November's election. Under his picture were the words "David S 
Young, A Tough Judge." Although no verbal promise was directly made by Judge 
Young, his picture, taken together with those words conveys a message that if Judge 
Young is re-elected, he will be tough, conservative, and traditional, rather than sensitive, 
liberal and progressive. This advertisement conveys partially towards the politically 
conservative. 
Canon 5(c )(2) states that a candidate shall not"... Solicit publicly stated 
support..." The advertisement listed names of attorneys who supported Judge Young. 
By allowing his picture to appear on the advertisement Judge Young solicited publicly the 
stated support on the attorneys listed. The language of Cannon 5(c )(2) indicates that 
indirect solicitation of publicly stated support is not permitted 
Either Judge Young knowingly allowed his committee to use his picture along with 
publicly stated endorsement, or his committee used his picture negligently. In either case, 
that advertisement, due to the picture and the endorsements, brings the judicial office into 
disrepute because of the prejudice it conveys. 
Canon 5(c )(2) allows committees established by a judge to solicit campaign 
contributions and support from lawyers. Also, the lawyers must be told that their 
contributions will not be known to the judge or the candidate. Judge Young's committee, 
the Committee for Judicial Excellence, made public the names of attorneys who 
contributed and the amounts they donated. Due to this disclosure, on November 4, 1996, 
the Salt Lake Tribune published an article that named two law firms that made 
contributions to Judge Young's committee and amounts given. Those law firms are Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker and Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic and Savage. (See. Salt Lake Tribune 
article attached hereto as exhibit A). One of these law firms, Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic and 
Savage, is representing Robert DeBry against Jan DeBry. The Salt Lake Tribune stated 
that this firm was one of the two largest contributors to Judge Young's struggle to retain 
the bench. During that time the Judge's committee continued to advertise in the Salt Lake 
Tribune. Therefore it is very likely that the Judge knew about the contributions of Berman, 
Gaufin, Tomsic and Savage. 
In accordance with Section 78-7-28(1) "A justice, judge, or justice court judge of 
any court of this state in accordance with the procedure prescribed in this section, may be 
removed from office, suspended, censured, involuntarily retired, or publicly or privately 
reprimanded for . . . (e) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a 
judicial office into disrepute " 
I believe that Judge Young has demonstrated conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice in the tort case of DeBry v. DeBry. 
The first occasion occurred when Judge Young, after exhibiting a hostile attitude 
towards Ms. Van Dijk, Jan DeBry's current divorce attorney, and refusing to allow her to 
complete her argument, ruled that Dr. Noel Gardner be permitted to perform an IME on 
Jan DeBry. Dr. Gardner had previously filed an affidavit for the Defendant which 
demonstrated that he (Gardner) had already formed an opinion about Jan DeBry, and was 
not therefore qualified to perform an unbiased, unprejudiced IME. 
The second occasion occurred when Judge Young allowed an expedited 
telephonic argument (without having received a Motion for Expedited Hearing) on a 
Motion for Protective Order brought by Mr. DeBry's counsel, Sid Baucom. This 
telephonic argument occurred within 24 hours after the filing of the Motion for Protective 
Order, and Plaintiffs counsel was not given an opportunity to research the motion or to 
reply to the motion in writing, but was forced to argue the motion without the benefit of 
research. Judge Young then ruled in favor of the Defendant. Defendant's counsel 
prepared a written Order, and presented the same to the Judge for signature. Judge 
Young signed the order the same day, and failed to allow the required five days for me to 
object to the Order in accordance with Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 




JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION 
Steven H. Stewart f 645 South 200 East #1TM 





WHEREAS, I have filed a complaint with the Judicial Conduct Commission of the State 
of Utah, against a member of the Judiciary, and 
WHEREAS, it will be necessary in the investigation of said matter, by the Commission or 
its Investigator, that the Judge be provided information concerning the complaint and/or a copy of 
that complaint. 
NOW THEREFORE, I do hereby authorize the Judicial Conduct Commission to 
-communicate my complaint to the Judge of whom I have complained, and to exhibit said written 
complaint to said Judge, and to discuss the same with the Judge or other court personnel, or other 
persons having knowledge of the matter. 
DATED this Of May , 19# 
Signature^" Complainant ^ 
frNo, 
Witnesi 
George L, Wrigh* 
Please type or print name in full 
ADDENDUM 3 
V 
1 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
Michae l O. Leavi t t 1 Orange Street Community 
Governor 1 Correctional Center 
EL L. H a u n I 80 South Orange Street 
Executive Director I Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Mr. George Wright, Esq. 
1600 Dove Street 
Suite 130 
Newport Beach, CA 92660 
November 16, 1999 
Dear Mr. Wright, 
As per our telephone conversation yesterday, I am writing to confirm the dates parolee Jennifer 
Austin has been a resident of the Orange Street Community Correctional Center (OSCCC). 
Ms. Austin arrived here on July 6, 1999. In August, she transferred from the OSCCC women's 
program into the OSCCC mentally ill offender program. 
Ms. Austin has made satisfactory progress in the mentally ill offender program. She is 
scheduled for release on November 23,1999. 
In summary, Ms. Austin has resided at OSCCC from July 6, 1999 to the present. 
Please feel free to contact me at (801) 596-6316 if you have any other questions. 
Sincerely Yours, 
zl ></Wo« 
Deborah Davidson, Director 
Orange Street Community Correctional Center 
cc: Jennifer Austin 
Subscribed and sworn to before 
Notary Public I 
WILMA EDWARDS ASHLEY | 
80 South Orange Street _ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 | 
My Commission Expire*
 a 
February 7,2002 I 
C * 4 a * i J i i i . k 
t h i s f(o day ofMlMAJ«W999. 
NOTARY P U B L I C u 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
Expires: 2 . - ^ flft^ 
